Propensity and Possibility by Meixner, Uwe
P R O P E N S I T Y A N D P O S S I B I L I T Y 
(1) In his book Aquinas Anthony Kenny says on page 29/30: "Interest 
in logical formalisms which obliterate the distinctions between the po-
tential and the actual ('possible worlds') is currently more fashionable 
than the serious study of potentiality". Kenny's remark is somewhat 
unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: In the first place, the formal 
analysis of modalities is an accomplishment of the possible-worlds-
theory of possibility that is not to be despised. In the second place, the 
charge of obliterating the distinction between the potential and the 
actual can only be raised against certain, by no means generally ac-
cepted variants of the possible-worlds-theory of possibility (for exam-
ple, the conception of David Lewis). Nevertheless Kenny's remark -
in the context of a book on a medieval philosopher - inspired me to 
attempt a theory of possibility that does without possible worlds (pos-
sible alternatives, possible situations, possible events, possible states-
of-affairs etc.), that does without any (mere) possibilia at all , yet distin-
guishes truth, possibility and necessity, and treats possibility as a non-
epistemic, non-syntactic concept. Such a theory has already existed. It 
is the scholastic theory of powers, propensities and dispositions. It has 
traditionally been condemned as utterly metaphysical (in the pejorative 
sense); but compared with the possible-worlds-theory it isn't so badly 
metaphysical after al l , as we shall see. 
The propensity-theory of possibility need not and wil l not be con-
sidered as the correct theory of possibility. The greater ontological 
parsimony of the propensity-theory with respect to possibilia is coun-
tered by the wider field of application of the possible-worlds theory. 
Moreover, possible-worlds-theory and propensity-theory have each 
their favorite problems, in which each does better than the other. The 
analysis of counterfactual conditionals is, it seems to me, entirely the 
domain of the possible-worlds-theory, whereas the propensity-theory 
has an at least considerable advantage in the field of the analysis of 
comparative possibility-statements ("that A is the case is more possible 
than that B is the case"), in the field of the analysis of the distinction 
between "real" and "merely theoretical" possibility, and in the field of 
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the analysis of disposition-predicates, especially comparative disposi-
tion-predicates as for example is more breakable than y". 
(2) Let L 0 , a sub-language of L , be a two-sorted language of predi-
cate-logic with identity, with variables xyy, z,. . . for individuals, and 
variables / , g, A , . . . for properties of these individuals. A, B, C , . . . 
are used to schematically designate sentences of L 0 . " / ( * ) " of L ( ) 
expresses that individual x has the property / . If A[x] is a predicate of 
L 0 , then A;c^4[x] is a singular term of L 0 that can be substituted for 
property-variables of L 0 , and for no other variables of L (without 
damage to wellformedness). 
Beside the elementary laws of predicate logic with identity we have 
(with respect to L 0 ) the axiom-schema of abstraction 
If- /\x(\yA[y](x) = A[x]) (x not in A[y], y not in A[x]) 
and the rule of property-identity 
i f ii- /\y(f(y) = g{y)h then l h / = g. 
The rule of property-identity is weaker than the principle of extensional-
ity: lh /\y(f(y) = g(y)) 3 / = g; the latter is not valid for properties 
(in the normal sense), but for sets; while the former is valid for proper-
ties, if they are not ultrafine-grained. The principle of extensionality 
does allow to prove lh ky(A A y = y) = \y(y = y) v \y(A A y = y) = 
\y(y + y), while the rule of property-identity does not. (This is to be 
kept in mind in view of the importance of properties \y(A A y = y) in 
this paper; see Section 8.) The possibility of interpreting / , g, . . . as 
referring to sets, which, indeed, is not excluded by the above principles, 
can be ruled out by postulating the negation of the principle of exten-
sionality: ih V/VSCAJK/OO - *ü0) A / * g). 
L 0 is supposed to be a purely "momentary" and ^actual" language; 
that is, the truth-value of each sentence of L 0 at a given moment of 
time depends only on the actual state of the world at that moment (not 
on earlier or later actual or merely possible states of the world, not on 
merely possible contemporary alternatives; to occur at a certain mo-
ment is not a characteristic of a world-state considered in itself). The 
reader is reminded that these remarks have a merely clarificatory func-
tion, and should not be taken to imply the acceptance of an ontology 
of world-states. 
A s has been mentioned, L 0 is a sub-language of L. L includes in 
addition variables r, / ' , f",. . . taking moments of time as values, a con-
stant n for now, variables r, r', f. . . taking real numbers qua quantities 
as values, and standard names for real numbers qua quantities, more-
over standard arithmetical expressions r + r', r - r',. . . . I proceed on 
the assumption that the moments of time have the same structure as 
the real numbers qua positions', I therefore identify the moments of time 
with the real numbers qua positions: t, t', f. . . refer to real numbers qua 
positions, r, r', r". . . to real numbers qua quantities. t<.t' means that 
t' is later than t\ r <r' means that r* is greater than r. 
In addition L includes a fourplace functional expression that can be 
substituted for variables that take real numbers qua quantities as values, 
and for no other variables of L (preserving wellformedness): 
pro(*, t, f, t'). The form of an atomic propensity-statement is 
"pro(x, /, / , /') = r " or "pro(*, /, / , t') < r" : "the quantity of the pro-
pensity of x at t to be / at t' is [is smaller than] r" . Instead of "the 
quantity of the propensity . . . " I simply say "the propensity . . . " , anal-
ogously to saying "the probability . . . " instead of "the quantity of the 
probability . . ." . It has only to be kept in mind that neither propensities 
nor probabilities are real numbers; they are only measured by them. 
(3) For the concept of propensity a heuristic can be formulated in 
the possible-worlds-theory that yields the same principles as the rather 
different heuristic I shall actually use below. In order to determine 
pro(*, t, f, t') consider the set Pt of those possible worlds which coincide 
with the real world up to (and including) moment t out of a given finite 
set of nomologically possible worlds including the real world; let n be 
the cardinal number of Pt, and c the number of worlds out of Pt in 
which x i s / a t t'\ we can define pro(jc, t, f, t') = cln - and we will obtain 
the principles listed and discussed below. 
O f course the above procedure doesn't capture the concept of pro-
pensity (Propensity), but rather one out of many relative concepts of 
propensity; they are relative to a given finite set of nomologically 
possible worlds including the real world. Such relative concepts of 
propensity have structural properties over and above those of Pro-
pensity. For example, we have \Zt/\x/\f/\t'(pro(x,t,f,t') = 
0 v pro(*, t, f, t') = 1), for sooner or later there will be no more 
branching of the world-tree because of the finite number of considered 
nomologically possible worlds. 
The assumption of the finiteness of Pt is a serious drawback of this 
heuristic, since this assumption is rather unrealistic indeed (of course, 
only if nomological determinism is to be rejected, for if nomological 
determinism is right, Pt is not only finite for every moment f, but 
consists merely of the real world). A s long as Pt is countably large, we 
might attach positive weight (why should a weight be 0?) to each world 
out of P, , the sum of these weights being 1, and consider pro(x, r, / , t') 
to be the sum of the weights of those worlds out of Pt in which x is / 
at f'. But the question arises in what manner we should attach weights 
to the worlds out of Pt\ there are uncountably many ways in which this 
can be done. Unavoidably this leads to a subjectivist conception of 
propensity, which we, however, have to avoid if we want to use the 
concept of propensity for the analysis of objective concepts of possibil-
ity. Finally, this approach fails when Pt is uncountably large (even if 
we allow non-denumerably many members of the sum: all the weights 
were supposed to be positive), which, after al l , seems to be commonly 
the case. 
Nevertheless it should not go unmentioned that the possible-worlds 
heuristic allows an intuitively satisfactory justification of a propensity-
principle (i.e. P3) where the other heuristic actually used here is not 
so intuitively satisfactory. 
(4) The concept of Propensity will here be explained by two notions 
that are well-known from ordinary discourse: distance from realization 
and difficulty of realization.1 Some examples for this: "It's rather diffi-
cult for him to reach the 9.30 plane to London" , "He is further away 
from being President this time next year than he was a month ago", 
"It's easier for me to be at Jim's place at noon, than it is for me to 
pick you up at the church at 11.45". It would be a mistake to interpret 
these sentences as simply expressing subjective probability judgments. 
(This seems anyway to be possible only for the first two.) Y o u can be 
proved to be mistaken about difficulties of realization, you cannot be 
proved to be mistaken about your own subjective probabilities (lapses 
of memory aside): This is normal: " H e had a helicopter? Wel l , then it 
was of course not difficult for him to reach the 9.30 plane to London" . 
But this is deviant: " H e had a helicopter? Wel l , then my probability 
for his reaching the 9.30 plane to London was of course not low". 
The notion of distance from realization is merely a metaphorical 
variant of the notion of difficulty of realization; its cognitive content 
coincides with that of the latter. I shall use them interchangeably. These 
notions allow numerical gradations which have a lower limit: 0 (it makes 
no sense to speak of negative distances or difficulties), but no upper 
limit, that is, there is no highest real number that can measure a 
distance from realization or be a degree of difficulty of realization. It 
may happen in a particular case that no real number greater than or 
equal to 0 can be assigned measuring distance from realization. If we 
read d(x, t, / , t') as "the difficulty for x at M o be / at t'" (or as "the 
distance of x at t from being / at f '") , then we can define: 
pro(x, f, / , / ' ) : = l/(d(x, t, /, t') + 1), in case d(x,t,f,t') is a real 
number greater than or equal to 0; if it is not a real number greater 
than or equal to 0 (but rather some arbitrary non-numerical object 
singled out to give d(x, f, / , t') an artificial value where this function is 
initially not defined), then pro(x, f, / , * ' ) : = 0. 
d(x, t, /, t') is here understood in such a way that for the determina-
tion of its value only the inner and outer determinants operative on x 
at t are to be considered, not, however, the independent effort (intensio 
or conatus) x at t puts into being / at t' (indeed, there might not be 
such a thing); in other words, d(x, f, / , t') is the correlate of what is 
given to x at t with respect to the realization of / at t' (not of what he 
makes out of what is given to him). (The effort x puts into being / at 
t' at some moment prior to t may well be a determinant operative on x 
at / which influences d(x, f, / , f').) This particular way of understanding 
d(x, r, / , tf) results from the fact that we are not interested in the power 
of x at t to be f at t', but only in the propensity of x at t to be / at t' 
(the former might be quite high while the latter is low; this would be 
due to the great exertions x undertakes at t to be / at t'). 
Difficulty of realization is here treated as a basic functional notion 
which is not analyzed in terms of a more basic one. It will be argued 
that we have an intuitive grasp of it and can even determine precise 
values for it (see Section 7); hence I am justified in leaving it unana-
lyzed. A t first glance it may seem that it can be appropriately analyzed 
by degree of similarity between possible world-states. This analysis would 
of course bring in the possible-worlds-theory of possibility by the back-
door; therefore it must not be pursued here, and luckily we need not 
follow it, since the concept of difficulty of realization is sufficiently clear 
by itself. But, in fact, this proposed analysis is false. The difficulty for 
x at t to be / at t' may be low, while the state of the world at t is very 
much dissimilar from any at t possible t'-state of the world in which x 
is / . Consider a madman x pressing at t the red button, which act 
determines his end at t' in the general nuclear holocaust; the difficulty 
for x at M o die at t' is zero; but any at t possible f'-state of the world 
(each one including the annihilation of all higher forms of life) is very 
much dissimilar from the state of the world at t. (This argument is an 
adaptation of an argument by Ki t Fine against the Lewis-analysis of 
counterfactual conditionals employing the notion of comparative simi-
larity of possible worlds.) 
(5) From the considerations in Section 4 it can be immediately seen 
that we are justified in accepting the following principle as an axiom: 
PI l h 0 ^ p r o ( j c , / , / , r ' ) ^ 1. 
t k pro(x, f, / , t') = 1" means that d(x, / , / , / ' ) = 0; x has at t already 
reached the realization of / at t\ although, in case t<. t', it will take 
until the coming of t' until this realization becomes apparent. 
"pro(x, /, / , t') = 0", on the other hand, means that d(x, t, /, t') is nei-
ther equal to zero nor to any positive real number, or, in other words, 
that the realization of / at /' is at / (absolutely) unreachable for x. 
The property non(/) is \y ~ i f{y). The easier it is for x at t to be / 
at t\ the more difficult it is for x at / to be non(/) at t'. The taking into 
account of the independent effort of the agent for the determination of 
difficulty of realization, that is, the confusion of propensity with power, 
is responsible for the illusion that this is not generally true; x may of 
course have at t a high power to be / at f', and an equally high power 
to be non(/) at t'\ the first would be due to the high inclination of x at 
t to be / at / ' , the second would be due to the great effort x puts at t 
into being non(/) at f\ although his r-inclination to be non(/) at /' is 
low proportionally to the highness of the "contradictory'' inclination. 
In other words, the difficulty for x at t to be non(/) at t' is inversely 
proportional to the difficulty for x at t to be f at t': d(x, f, non( / ) , t') 
= l/d(jc, r , / , r'), given that pro(jc, r, / , t') and pro(;c, f, non(/) , f'), 
d(x,t,f,t') and d(x, r, non( / ) , t') differ from 0. This yields: 
pro(x, r, non( / ) , t') = 1 - pro(jc, r, / , /') given that pro(*, r, non( / ) , f'), 
pro(;c, f, / , O , d(x,t,f,t') and d(x, f, non(/) , t') differ from 0. Now: 
d(x, t, non( / ) , tf) is no real number greater than or equal to 0 iff 
d(xy r, / , t') - 0; d(x, t, /, t') is no real number greater than or equal to 
0 iff d(x, r, non( / ) , t') = 0. This yields: pro(*, r, non(/) , t') = 
1 - pro(;c, r, / , f'), given that pro(x, r, non(/) , t') or pro(jc, r, / , t') or 
d(x, r, / , t') or d(x, t, non( / ) , t') is 0. These considerations justify us in 
assuming as an axiom: 
P2 lh pro(*, / ,non(/) , /') = ! - pro(jc, t, /, t'). 
The property ( /U g) is Ay( / (y ) v g(y)), and the property ( / f l g) is 
hy(f(y) A g(y))- I postulate as axioms: 
P3 lh pro(x, /, ( / U g), 0 = pro(x, f, / , t') + pro(x, r, g, f'), 
- p r o ( * , f, ( / H g ) , / ' ) , 
P4 lh pro(x, r, (/Pi non(/)) , t') = 0. 
Like the principles P I and P2, P3 and P4 correspond to well-known 
probabilistic principles. (No surprise: the propensity-definition of prob-
ability is a viable alternative to other definitions of probability. 2) The 
rationale for P4 in terms of the distance-heuristic is clear: d(x, 
/, ( / f l non(/)) , /') is no real number greater than or equal to zero, 
whatever JC, /, t\ o r / m a y be. But P3 throws more light on the distance-
heuristic than the distance-heuristic throws on P3. Here we can use 
with advantage the possible-worlds-heuristic introduced in Section 3, 
which gives a straightforward intuitive justification for P3. 
(6) I now come to principles for Propensity that have no probabilistic 
analogues. Consider first the propensity of x at / to be / at the very 
same moment t. What sizes can be taken on by this propensity? One 
easily sees that there are only two possibilities; for either x is f at £, or 
x is not / at t\ in the former case being non(/) at t is unreachable for 
x at r, that is, d(x, ty non(/) , r) is no real number greater than or equal 
to 0, that is, pro(x, t, non(/) , t) = 0, that is, pro(x, t, /, i) = 1; in the 
latter case being / at t is unreachable for x at t, that is, pro(x, / , / , t) = 
0. I accordingly postulate as an axiom: 
P5 lh pro(jc, f,/, t) = 1 v pro(x, f, / , t) = 0. 
Propensities can change in time. The distance of x from the realiza-
tion of / at t' can become greater and smaller; but only as long as x 
does not arrive at the realization of / a t t'. If it does arrive there, it has 
to stay there; a realization cannot be taken back. Hence we have as an 
axiom: 
P6 lh pro(*, t, /, t') = lD f\i"(t <. f D pro(;t, / , t') = 1). 
The following axiom will not be used for the purposes of this paper. 
It is included in order to show that the concept of Propensity is interest-
ing to be investigated independent of the considerations this paper is 
limited to. 
It can be easily seen that AxAz(f(x)35 A y ( / ( x ) A y = y)(z)) is pro-
vable. What is in view of this fact the relation between pro(x, t, /, t') 
and pro(z,t, \y(f(x) A y = y),t')7 Let us for the moment - presys-
tematically - introduce propensities whose objects are not properties, 
but rather states-of-affairs. "pro( / ,p , t') - r " means, that the propen-
sity at t that the state-of-affair p is realized at r' is equal to r. (Singular 
terms referring to states-of-affairs can be obtained from any sentence 
of L 0 by prefixing "that" to it.) The provable general equivalence men-
tioned above shows that in every case the state-of-affair that x is f is 
identical to the state-of-affair that z is self-identical, while x is f. Hence 
we have in general: 
pro(r, that / (* ) , t') = pro(r, that \y(f(x) Ay = y)(z), t'). 
Now evidently pro(x, r, / , t') - pro(/, that / (* ) , t') and pro(z, t, 
ty(f(x) A y = y ) , O = pro(f, that \y(f(x) Ay = y)(z), r'). Hence we 
are justified in accepting as an axiom: 
P7 Ih pro(x, /, / , t') = pro(z, r, \y(f(x) A y = y), t9) 
For the time being I conclude the list of postulates (which is by no 
means complete; the complete list of axioms might, for example, in-
clude an axiom that states that propensities change continually in time 3). 
Before I wil l use the concept of Propensity for the explication of other 
concepts, I introduce a model that visualizes the matter of fact described 
by the above principles, and I give an example of the determination of 
the precise numerical value for d(x, t, / , r'), respectively pro(*, t, f, tf). 
(7) Let every straight line parallel to g represent a property; let every 
straight line parallel to / represent a moment of time: 
arrow of time | 
Above the plane partitioned in this manner lies a (porous, at most one-
point thick) blanket of points which are in part in vertical motion 
(relative to the plane). Consider this blanket in the phase For all 
points of the plane which are lower than or on the Mine we have that 
the blanket is attached to them or has a hole at their place. Holes in 
the blanket will never close once they have appeared, nor will the 
blanket ever disengage itself from any point of the plane it has once 
become attached to. In the part of the plane which is above the Mine 
we have, besides the cases of attachment and porosity of the blanket, 
a third case: some points of the blanket have a finite vertical distance 
to the plane; with respect to the part of the plane above the Mine the 
blanket is partly in suspension. If we observe the movement of the 
blanket during the interval r we will see that the blanket increasingly 
leaves its state of partial suspension. Consider it in the phase t + r. 
Then it is true for all points of the plane which are below or on the 
t + r-line that the blanket is either attached to them or has a hole at 
their place. A n d for the points of the plane above the t + r-line it is 
true that there are now more (or at least no less) among them to which 
the blanket is attached or where it has a hole than there were when 
the blanket had been in the phase t. (Where the blanket was previously 
attached there it still is, and where the blanket previously had a hole 
there it still has one). If there were a final time-line, an ultimate state 
would be reached when the blanket is in the phase corresponding to 
that time-line where for every point of the plane it is true that the 
blanket attaches to it or has a hole at its place. 
The blanket of points above the plane represents an indeterministic 
individual x. For every phase t of the blanket x there is a complete 
description of the function d(x, t, /, t'). Consider the blanket in such a 
phase and consider the point of intersection of the r'-line and the / -
line: ( / , t'). If x has a hole at ( / , f'), then d(x, f, / , t') is no real number 
greater than or equal to 0, but, say, Napoleon. If x is attached to ( / , f'), 
then d(x, f, / , t') = 0. If there is a point of the blanket vertically above 
(/, t') (it is at most one), then d(x, t, /, t') = r, where r is the distance 
of that point from the plane. 
The positions of the points of the blanket are not in every case 
independent of each other in a certain phase of the movement of the 
blanket. If p is a point of the blanket vertically above (/, t') at the 
positive distance r, then there is a point of the blanket p' vertically 
above (non(/) , /') at the distance 1/r; if the blanket attaches to ( / , f'), 
then it has a hole at (non(/) , f ' ) ; if it has a hole at ( / , / ' ) , then it 
attaches to (non(/) , / ' ) . If / and g are properties which exclude each 
other [their conjunction is identical to ( / f l non (/))], and if there is a 
point p' of the blanket having the vertical distance r from (/ , t') and a 
point p" of the blanket having the vertical distance r ' from (g, / ' ) , 
then there is a point p"' of the blanket having the vertical distance 
(r - r' - l ) / ( r + r' + 2) from ( ( / U g), t')\ and so on in the appropriate 
manner for the cases not yet considered. Moreover, we have at every 
point ( ( / H non(/)) , t') of the plane (no matter what property / is or 
what moment t') that the blanket has a hole there - no matter what 
phase the blanket is in. 
The description of this visual model is sufficient for the verification 
of the principles PI to P6, given the heuristic definition of pro(x, f, / , t') 
by d(x, r, / , t'). Significantly, there is no reference to any entities in the 
model that might be taken to represent possible alternatives ("worlds"). 
The propensity-theory of possibility can rightfully be called an "imma-
nent theory of possibility", since the only possible world it needs to 
take into account is the real world; it stays within the limits of this 
world (without thereby identifying truth and - objective - necessity!). 
The determination of the precise numerical value of d(x, r, / , t') and 
hence of pro(x, r, / , t') in a concrete case is difficult because there are 
so many factors that have to be considered for this. But it is not difficult 
to make accurate comparative non-numerical judgments of distance 
from (difficulty of) realization. Everyone of us does this. It would be 
unexplainable why we persist in this practice, if there were no objective 
fact of the matter referred to by these statements or if these statements 
were uncontrollable for us. Hence there are such things as distances 
from realization, and we are able to recognize them. 
In certain more or less artificial cases the numerical value of 
d(x,t, f,t'), respectively pro(x, /, / , t') can be precisely determined. 
Let x be a materially homogeneous die here on earth thrown straight 
into the air at t above a hard and plane surface of sufficient extent, and 
let it be excluded at / that the die is caught by somebody in mid air or 
manipulated, that it explodes in mid air, vanishes or anything; let it be 
excluded at t that the surface is removed, softened or deformed while 
the die is flying and for some time longer; then there is a moment /' 
later than r, such that the propensity of x at / to lie on the surface at 
t' showing one of its six sides uppermost is 1, and such that the propens-
ity of x at t to lie on the surface at /' showing, for example, 5 uppermost 
is 1/6. (The value 1/6 for the latter propensity can be deduced from 
the value 1 for the former propensity by applying the principles above, 
and by making use both of the fact that the die can show only one of 
its six sides uppermost [the property of showing its side n uppermost 
and the property of showing its side k uppermost exclude each other 
for n ± k] and of the fact that the arrangement guarantees that no 
side is preferred - at r! - to any non-negligible degree. 4 pro(x, f, 
showing 5, /') = 1/6 does in no manner preclude that pro(* , f + , 
showing 5, t') = 1 for some t*, t <. t+ <. t', which means that the die's 
showing 5 at t' was inevitable prior to t'\ it is compatible with a species 
of determinism that assumes the determination of the present by the 
past, but leaves open just at what time each item of the present is 
determined; the time may be different for some or all items.) 
(8) 
D l P ( j c , r , / , O : = p r o ( j c , r , / , O ^ 0 
(it is possible for x at t to be f at t'), 
D2 A / ( j c , r , / , 0 - p r o ( x , / , / , r ' ) = l 
(it is necessary for x at t to be f at t'),5 
D3 T(x, / , 0 : = pro(x, U A 0 = 1 
(x is fat t). 
Then we have the following theorems: 
T l Ih JV(JC, u / , O s "I P(x, U non(/) , t')9 
T2 Ih T(x, /,/) = -! T(x, non(/) , 0 , 
T3 Ih T(x, /, t) s N(JC, /, / , t) = P(x9 /, / , 0-
T3 will shortly be commented on. The step from the three- or four-
place predicates introduced in D 1 - D 3 to sentence-connectives is made 
in the next triad of definitions. The iteration and interlacing of these 
connectives is syntactically forbidden, since for substitution into their 
scope only sentences of L 0 are admitted, and every sentence containing 
one of these connectives is not a sentence of L 0 (but only of L ) . This 
restriction is not a must; solely for reasons of problem-reduction I 
exclusively consider propensities which have as their objects "manifest" 
and "momentary" properties (properties whose exemplification or non-
exemplification by an individual at a certain moment depends only on 
the actual state of the world at that moment); this precisely has the 
consequence that only sentences of L 0 can be substituted into the scope 
of the connectives to be introduced now: 
D4 P(t, A, O : = \JxP(x, t, Xy(A Ay = y), t') (x, y not in A) 
(it is possible at t that it is the case at t' that A), 
D5 N(t, A, t') : - /\xN(x, ^ Ay(A A y = y),1') (x, y not in A), 
(it is necessary at t that it is the case at t' that A), 
D6 T(U A) : s /\xT(x, ky(A A y = y)91) 
(it is the case at t that A). 
We have the following theorems which show the adequacy of these 
definitions for introducing alethic modal operators: 
T4 lh N(t,A, t') = - i P(t, -iA, 0 , 
T5 \\-N(t,A,t')DT(t\A), 
T6 H-N(t,A,t') A N(t,ADB,t')DN(t,B,t'), 
T7 If \bA9 then \\-N(t,A,t'). 
(For the proof of T6 I have used the following two other theorems: 
lh pro(*, /, / , /') = 1 A pro(*, /, g, /') = 1 
Dpro(x9t9 ( / O g ) , 0 = l 
lh pro(*, t, f, t') = r A pro(*, t, (f f l non(g)), /') = 0 
D r ^ p r o ( x , f , g , t').) 
The next theorem shows as much as T3 that the alethic modalities 
introduced by D 1 - D 6 are special ones: 
T8 lh T(t9 A) ^ N(t, A, t) s P(t,A, t). 
T3 and T8 can best be understood intuitively by considering that the 
concept of necessity captured by D5 and D2 is that of unchangeability. 
If it is the case at t that A, then it is unchangeable at t that it is the 
case at t that A\ if x is / at f, then being / at t is unchangeable for x at 
/. This intuitively justifies T(t, A) D N(t, A, t) and T(x,f,t)D 
N(x, t, / , / ) . (For lh P(t,A, t) D T(t, A): lh T(t, -)A)D N(t, ~i A, t), 
hence lh ~iN(t, ~i A, t)D ~i T(t, -u4), hence \\-P(t,A, t) D T(t,A) 
by T4 and lh T(t, A) = i T(t, -nA) which is provable using T2.) 
T 4 - T 8 are sentential principles for modalities. A quantificational 
principle is for example the converse of the Barcan-formula: 
N(t9 /\xA[x]9t')D /\xN(t9A[x]9t'), which is provable without extra 
axioms. The Barcan-formula itself: f\xN(t9A[x]9 t') D N(t9 f\xA[x], t') 
is uncontroversial within the propensity-theory of possibility, since re-
ference to various possible worlds with their respective universes of 
discourse is out of the question. But the formula is not provable without 
additional axioms. I sketch its proof within an extended axiom-system: 
The great conjunction of all properties / such that \Jx(f = 
Ay' (A[x] Ay' = / ) ) , p , is identical with \y'(/\xA[x] Ay' = y'); conse-
quently pro(>, t9 p9 /') = 1 D pro(>, t9 A / ( A * ^ M A / = / ) , 
0 = 1 ; but pro(y, r, p, O = 1 iff A ^ ( p r o ( y , r , A / ( i 4 M A / = / ) , 
O = 1); hence ^x^y(Vro{y9 r, ky'{A[x\ A / = / ) , 0 = 1) 3 
f\y(pxo(y919 A / ( A * ^ M A yf = y')91') = 1), hence by D5 the Barcan-
formula. 6 
(9) The usual appearance of modal connectives is, for example, 
reached by the following definition which interprets "it is necessary 
that A" as meaning the same as "it is now already unchangeably fixed 
that it will be the case that A": 
D7 N*A:= \Jt(n <. t A N(n9 A91)). 
Compare this definition with the definition of "it will be the case that 
A": 
D8 FA:=\/t(n<.t A T(t9A)). 
It can easily be proved: 
T9 \\-N*ADFA. 
The reverse of T9 cannot be proved. But there is some possibility of 
confusing N*A and FA. Consider that T(t9 A) in the definition of FA 
is synonymous with N(t9 A9t)9 and consider that the phrase "there is a 
later time at which it is necessary that A" can be read both in the sense 
of "there is a later time such that it is now necessary that it is the case 
at it that A" (N*A)9 and in the sense of "there is a later time such that 
it is necessary at it that it is the case that A" (FA). This confusion may 
be one of the reasons underlying attempts to "prove" determinism with 
respect to the future. 
The sentential connective N + is directed in the reverse temporal 
direction of T V * : 
D9 N+A : s \/t(t^. n A N(n9A9t)). 
D9 gives "it is necessary that A" a different sense than D7 does, namely 
the sense of "it is now unchangeably fixed that it was or is the case 
that A". Not surprisingly we can prove 
T10 \\-N+A = PA v A. 
if we define PA by 
D10 PA :=\Jt(t<.n A T(t9A))9 
and add to our list of postulates 
P8 \VA = T{n9A). 
(P8 sanctions substitution of T(n,A) for A only where this is syntacti-
cally possible; the following is incorrect not merely because the infer-
ence is not valid, but because it leads to an ill-formed expression: 
"N(t9A9t')9 hence N(t9 T{n9A)9t'y\) 
The formula FAD N*A expresses a version of determinism that 
might be termed "forward-determinism"; according to forward-determ-
inism the future is fixed by the present. "Backward-determinism" is 
expressed by A D \Jt'(t' <. n A N(t'9A9 n)); according to backward-
determinism the present is fixed by the past. Of course, concerning 
determinism there seems to be nothing special about the present; there-
fore, whoever accepts backward- or forward-determinism will presum-
ably also accept the more general deterministic hypotheses 
/\t(T(t9 A) D \Jt'(t' < . t A N(t',A9 t))) or A'(\A'(* <•' ' A T(t'9 A)) 
D\Jt'(t<.t' A i V ( U , 0 ) ) . ? 
By defining another necessity-operator N# we can express backward-
determinism - just like forward-determinism - without explicit refer-
ence to moments of time by A DN*A: 
D i l N*A : s \Jt(t <. n A N(t9A9 n)). 
(Compare definitions D9 , D10 and D i l ! ) D i l interprets "it is necessary 
that A " as "it was unchangeably fixed that it is now the case that ^4". 
(10) Finally I would like to show the use of the concept of Propensity 
for the analysis of disposition predicates. A s examples I will pick the 
predicates " J C is inflammable" and " J C is at least as inflammable as y". 
I will designate the property expressed by the manifest predicate "x is 
burning" by " 6 " . There are uses of "x is inflammable" in which it 
implies "x is not burning"; there are others in which it is implied by 
"x is burning" (you cannot have both, or else you will be able to prove 
that nothing burns). I select is inflammable" in the second sense for 
analysis: 
(1) x is (at all) inflammable := \Jt(n ^. t A pro(x, n, b, t) > 0). 
This is " J C is inflammable" in a very weak sense. We can give it a very 
strong sense: 
(2) x is (very) inflammable := \Jt(n ^. t A pro(x, n, b, t) > 0.9). 
Concerning "x is at least as inflammable as the basic analysis is: 
(3) x is (always from now on) at least as inflammable as 
y : = f\t(n ^. t D pro(y, n, b, t) ^ pro(x, «, b, t)). 
But normally one doesn't mean to assert something as strong as this 
by saying "x is at least as inflammable as y " ; rather one is tacitly and 
more or less vaguely referring to a certain time interval [n,r 0 ] , and 
means to say that x is at least as inflammable as y in this interval (t0 is 
normally rather close to n): 
(3') x is (up to t0) at least as inflammable as y '= /\t(n ^. t 
^. t0 D pro(y, n, b, t) ^ pro(x, n, b, t)). 
The definitions (1) and (2) above can be modified with the same justifi-
cation in the same manner (3) has been modified in (3'); this yields 
definitions (V) and (2'). A n y analysis of "x is at least as inflammable 
as y " and "y is inflammable" ought to justify the following inference: 
"y is inflammable, x is at least as inflammable as y —>x is inflammable". 
This inference is justified on the basis of the definitions (1) and (3), (2) 
and (3), (1') and (3'), and (2') and (3'). 
The orthodox analysis of disposition-predicates by conditionals is in 
some cases apparently false: Let x be an atom of a certain newly formed 
radioactive substance. We would certainly say that x is decay able. But 
do we mean by this that if x were subjected to certain conditions (at 
an arbitrary time t, n^.t) it would invariably decay? It seems not: 
there are no such conditions known; hence we cannot be certain that 
if x were subjected to certain conditions it would decay; but we are 
nonetheless certain that x is decayable. Rather, by "x is decayable" we 
mean that \Jt(n ^. t A pro(x, n, d, t) > 0), and we can be more specific 
than that: pro(x, n,d,n + T) = 1/2, pro(x, n,d,n + IT) = 3/4, pro(x, 
n,d,n + 3r) = 7/8, . . . , r being the radioactive period of the (newly 
formed) substance, x is belonging to . 8 
A short notice concerning "real" vs. "merely theoretical" possibility. 
The distinction between real and merely theoretical possibility is well-
rooted in ordinary language. For the propensity-theory of possibility 
there is no difficulty in reconstructing this distinction: it is "really" 
possible for x at t to be / at t' iff pro(x, / , t') > 0.5; it is "merely 
theoretically" possible for x at / to be / at t' iff 0 < pro(x, /, / , t') ^ 0.5. 
N O T E S 
1 The connection between difficulty (or ease) of realization, (objective) possibility, and 
objective probability is an old one, going at least as far back as Leibniz. Ian Hacking 
writes in [71], p. 602: "In the early days of probability the word 'possibility' did not mean 
the epistemic or subjective notion commonly associated with Laplace. When Leibniz 
says, "probability is degree of possibility", it is clear from the context that 'possibility' 
itself is a synonym for the ease of making an outcome, that is, for the physical property 
we call 'propensity' or 'tendency to occur'. Far from being idiosyncratic, this usage was 
widespread. Indeed, although in his more philosophical writings Laplace professes to 
assign an epistemic use to 'possibility', in his most important work on the probability of 
causes even Laplace uses 'possibility' to mean objective propensity". Hacking continues: 
"Leibniz used 'equally possible' to mean something like 'having an equal propensity to 
occur'. He is also the first to use 'possibility' for a quite different idea which, for 
today's logician, has superseded every other. 'Possible', according to him means internally 
consistent". While Hacking is right (at least prima facie) in distinguishing two concepts 
of possibility (one admitting of degrees, the other not) and in noting the current eclipse 
of one of these, he is wrong in ascribing their discovery to Leibniz. The medievals were 
very well aware of the distinction: "Possibile autem fuit ens creatum esse, antequam esset 
per potentiam agentis, per quam et esse incoepit. Vel propter habitudinem terminorum in 
quibus nulla repugnantia invenitur: quod quidem possibile secundum nullam potentiam 
dicitur" (Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, 37). 
2 P. Humphreys argues in [85], p. 558f, that conditional propensities cannot be identified 
with conditional probabilities, since the latter satisfy Bayes' Law [for p(A), p(B) > 0: 
p(A/B) = (p(B/A) • p(A))/p(B)], while the former do not. But if we define 
pro(x, t, fig, tf) := pro(jc, t, (f H g), t') :pro(jc, t, g, t'), provided pro(;c, t, g, /') 4 0; then 
the probabilistic principles P1-P4 are sufficient for deducing the analogue of Bayes' 
Law, and these principles are intuitively well-founded for propensities as representing 
difficulties of realization. If propensities are understood in this sense, which is not 
idiosyncratic - see note 1 - then there is no need to pay the high price of changing the 
calculus of probability (what Humphreys thinks ought to be done; see [85], p. 557) in 
order to identify objective probability and propensity. 
3 This implies: For any *, / , t and t', t<.t\ there is inbetween / and t' a. continuous 
graph that reaches the value 1 or 0 at t' at the very latest, and continues constantly after 
having once reached 1 or 0. This graph is called "the realization-curve for x and / from 
t to f'". Here an example of such a realization-curve: 
4 M . C. Galavotti states in [87], p. 363: "single-case propensity theories of probability 
show severe difficulties with respect to applicability. Various problems of this kind were 
already stressed by H . Kyburg in 1974, when he pointed out that, in spite of statements 
to the effect that frequencies do not define propensities, the only method the advocates 
of propensity theory have at their disposal in order to assign a value to a dispositional 
strength, and to test it, is that of relying on frequencies". My example ought to show, 
(1) that Kyburg is not right, (2) that the difficulties for the applicability of single-case 
propensity theories (while not to be underestimated) can at least in some cases be 
overcome. 
5 A definition with some similarity to this one is given in Giere [79], p. 444: "We will 
assume, then, that expressions of the form PrA(X) = r refer to the propensity of some 
system in initial state A to reach a final state in X on some particular trial or sets of 
trials. Utilizing the basic intuition that a propensity of one should correspond to causal 
necessity, we can quite plausibly define a notion of system necessity for stochastic systems 
in terms of unit propensities as follows: 
(SNS) Nec(X)=T>{.(A)PrA(X) = V\ 
But Giere is quantifying over possible initial states, which is avoided here. If y is the 
system referred to, A its actual initial state, t the initial time (^ 4 is the state y is in at f), 
/ + r the time of the system's final state; then we have: PrA(X) = 1 iff pro(>>, r, X, t + r) = 
1. 
6 Smokier writes in [79], p. 503: "The acceptance of de re modalities signifies that one 
accepts the existence of possible worlds and possible individuals (some of which are 
actual) which possess necessary properties. This is the ontology which it seems to me the 
acceptance of single-case probabilities forces upon us". An irreducible de re modal 
statement that is well-formed in L is, for example, any L-sentence of the form 
\JxN(t, A[x], t'). The acceptance of such a sentence as true does of course - as should 
be clear by now - not imply that there are possible worlds or possible individuals (other 
than real ones), and neither does the acceptance of single-case probabilities, at least if 
they are identified with propensities. With one proviso: that the notion of property (as 
a kind of intensional entity) is clear without recourse to (mere) possibilia (in particular, 
that no property is a mere possibilium itself). This is not uncontroversial. For D . Lewis, 
for example, properties are best identified with sets of possible individuals (including 
non-actual ones). See Lewis [86]; but consider Armstrong [78] and Bealer [82] where 
(although in quite different settings) the conception of properties as basic non-possibilistic 
entities is carefully stated and ably defined. 
7 M . C. Galavotti says in [87], p. 363: " A direct philosophical shortcoming of propensity 
theory is that it involves a commitment to indeterminism". This may be true of other 
propensity theories, it is not true of the propensity theory developed in this paper. 
Determinism in its strongest version simply means that the value of every propensity 
(which is always the propensity of some object at some time to have some property at 
the same or another time) is either 1 or 0. It does not follow from the propensity theory 
given here that this kind of determinism does not obtain. Hence it does not follow from 
it that any weaker version of determinism does not obtain, specifically such a version of 
determinism that allows some propensities to have a value greater than 0 and less than 
1, as for example /\t(T(t, A) D \ft'(t' <. t A N(t\A, t))): according to this statement 
there may be, given 7(r, A), infinitely many times f prior to t at which for some x 
0 < pro(jc, f", \y(A A y = y),t) < 1, provided there is a time t' prior to t at which for all 
x pro(jc, r\ \y(A A y = y),t) = 1. (By the way, we have II- A*Az(P r o(*< *y(A A y = 
y) , t') = pro(z, t, \y(A A y = y) , t')), using P7 and Ih \y(A A y = y) = Ay'(Ay(,4 A y = 
y)(x) A y ' = / ) . ) 
8 In [79], p. 448, Giere argues as follows: "If we regard time as continuous, which seems 
to be standard scientific practice, then according to our standard measure theory, each 
instant of time has zero probability of being the time of decay. But if the atom decays 
at all, then at least one time is physically possible. So we must give up the identification 
of physical necessity with unit propensity - at least for systems with non-denumerable 
outcome sets". To make this more explicit: Assume necessity is unit propensity, hence 
impossibility is zero propensity, and possibility is non-zero propensity; for any t: the 
probability (as of now) that x decays at t is zero, hence, since probability = propensity, 
for any t\ the propensity (as of now) that x decays at / is zero, hence for all t: it is (now) 
impossible that x decays at /; assume x decays at some time; hence for some time r: it is 
(now) possible that x decays at t - contradiction. But how does Giere get the idea that 
for any r: the probability that x decays at t is zero? "The sum of pro(*, n, f,t) over all 
t is smaller than or equal to 1" and / \ r / \ / ' ( p r o ( j c , / , 0 = pro(jc, n, f, t')) yield of 
course, given that time is continuous, /\r(pro(jc, n, f, t) = 0). But why should we assume 
these principles, both of which are glaringly false? (Assume pro(x, n, f,n) = 1 - x is now 
/ - and pro(x, n, /, t') = 1/2). 
But might there not be a real problem concerning continuity? Space is a continuum. 
Hence there are non-denumerably many locations /, hence non-denumerably many prop-
erties being-at~l, being-at-V, which all exclude each other given / /'. Now, let JC be a 
material object in space; then pro(x, n, \y\JI(y is at l),t)= 1, that is, the sum of 
pro(*, n, being-at-/, /) over all / is 1; and apparently there is a set of non-denumerably 
many locations, such that for all members /, /' of that set pro(*, n, being-at-/, t) > 0 and 
pro(*, n, being-at-/, /) = pro(*, n, being-at-/', t). But clearly this cannot be, and the fact 
that it cannot be is not contra-intuitive. Indeed, if it is guaranteed at n that there is no 
force acting on x between n and t Newton's Law tells us: \Jl(pro(x, n, being-at-/, t) = 
1 A ± ID pro(*, n, being-at-/', t) = 0)). (There is no such nice solution to the prob-
lem if you consider it mutatis mutandis for subjective probabilities. Why shouldn't I now 
think it equally possible for non-denumerably many locations that x is at them at /? But 
no, I can't rationally do this. This seems strange.) 
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